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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JEROME K. DUNCAN,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 950227-CA

vs.
EILEEN M. HOWARD; SANDRA
THORDERSON and LARRY THORDERSON;
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Human Services,

Priority No. 4

Defendants/Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/THORDERSONS

INTRODUCTION
The
hereinafter

appellants,

be referred

appellants/Thordersons
"Thordersons' brief."

Larry

and

Sandra

Thorderson,

to as "Thordersons."

will

hereinafter

be

will

The brief of
referred

to

as

The plaintiff/respondent will hereinafter

be referred to "Jerry Duncan."

The brief of respondent will

hereinafter be referred to as "Duncan's brief."
An addendum is attached to this reply brief, which is the
memorandum decision of the Honorable John A. Rokich, dated December
6, 1994.
Duncan's brief contains two major points with several
subpoints under Point I. Thordersons' reply brief will correspond
with Points I and II of Duncan's brief wherever possible.

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Jerry Duncan did not provide any means of financial

support to the Thordersons for the care, support, maintenance and
education of the minor child, Clel Howard.
2.

(R: 655, 862, 911.)

Thordersons were the sole means of support to Clel

Howard and provided the stable and consistent home environment.
(R: 751, 754, 761-62, 854, 862, 1031, 1065-66, 1071.)
3.

Jerry Duncan portrays a consistent relationship with

the minor child after his move to Utah.

Nevertheless, Larry

Thorderson reports that there were erratic visits by Jerry Duncan
with the minor child and only sporadic telephone contact once the
child moved to the State of Pennsylvania.
4.

(R: 856-57, 860.)

Eileen Howard testified that the reason Jerry Duncan

moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, was to visit his relatives and
decided to stay.
5.

(A: 59-60.)

Eileen Howard

further testified that there was

inconsistent contact by Jerry Duncan with the minor child and that
the child returned from visits tired, soaked, hyperactive, violent,
unbathed, unlaundered and with a rash.
6.

(A: 59-60.)

Sandra Thorderson testified that Jerry Duncan's

visit were erratic and without advance notice.
7.

(R: 747-48.)

Sandra Thorderson further testified that there were

no extensive telephone contacts with the minor child by Jerry
Duncan while the child lived in Pennsylvania.
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(R: 725.)

8.

Larry Thorderson testified that Jerry Duncan did not

request many visits with the minor child while the boy lived in the
State of Utah.

(R: 865.)

9.

During the period of September through November of

1992, when Eileen Howard brought the minor child to the State of
Utah, she reports that the child returned agitated and with food
allergies because Jerry Duncan did not follow the food lists.

(R:

1059-63.)
10.

Eileen Howard further stated that during the course

of visits between Jerry Duncan and the minor child in September
through November of 1992, the child did not like spending time with
Jerry Duncan and that she was concerned about the child's safety.
(R: 1059-63.)
11.

The evaluation conducted by Todd Otanez involved

only Jerry Duncan and Eileen Howard.
12.

(R: 162.)

Todd Otanez merely met Sandra Thorderson and had one

telephone contact with Larry Thorderson.

He did not address the

interests of Sandra and Larry Thorderson in his custody evaluation
report.

(A: 30-48.)
13.

Todd Otanez did not do any psychological testing of

the natural parents, Jerry Duncan and Eileen Howard.

(R: 553, 561,

564, 566, 569.)
14.

Todd Otanez did not report that there was a strong

mutual bond between Jerry Duncan and the minor child.
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(R: 541.)

15.

Jerry Duncan did not take the minor child to any

therapist or counselors prior to the transfer of the minor child
in June of 1995.

In addition, Jerry Duncan never took the minor

child to visit Dr. Daniel Moore.
16.

(R: 710.)

In accordance with the memorandum decision of the

Honorable John A. Rokich, datted December 6, 1994, the child1s
therapist was to communicate with Jerry Duncans therapist to
establish a treatment program and a visiting schedule for the
appellants which was to be submitted to the court for approval by
the end of the school year.

(Appendix, p. 7.)

Dr. Steven

Richfield was the childfs therapist through the Thordersons. Jerry
Duncan notified the appellants that his therapist was Newt Bryson.
Dr. Steven Richfield and Dr. Newt Bryson communicated on several
occasions.

The necessary documents from the evaluations and

reports of counselors and therapists was provided to Dr. Newt
Bryson.

As the child was to arrive to the State of Utah in his

transfer from the State of Pennsylvania in June of 1995, Jerry
Duncan advised the appellants that he was not going to use Dr. Newt
Bryson and changed his therapist to Dr. Chris Wehl.
the minor child never saw Dr. Newt Bryson.

As a result,

To this date, no

treatment plan has been submitted to the court.
17.

There

was

no

evidence

presented

at

trial

of

interference by the Thordersons with respect to the relationship
between Jerry Duncan and the minor child.

The Thordersons did not

in any way brainwash nor did they indoctrinate the minor child
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE
HUTCHISON STANDARD IN THIS CASE
Jerry Duncan did not return to the State of Utah so that
he could begin to establish a relationship with his son.

He came

to Utah to visit his relatives and decided to stay after his
arrival.

Jerry

Duncan

did

not make

an

effort

to

build a

relationship with his son while the child resided in the State of
Utah. After the child moved to the State of Pennsylvania with the
maternal grandparents and the natural mother, Jerry Duncan had very
sporadic contact with the minor child.
motion

to

obtain

temporary

custody

Even after he brought his
of

the

minor

maintained only sporadic contact with the child.

child,

he

Jerry Duncan

refused to recognize that the child had serious behavioral problems
and

did

not

consult

with

the

boy's

therapist

to

make

a

determination of the childfs needs.
Thordersons have set forth in their brief in depth the
basis upon which they maintain that they met the requirements of
the Hutchison standard. Thordersons maintain that they established
that Jerry Duncan did not develop a strong mutual bond with the
minor child.

He did not have a willingness to sacrifice his own

interest for that of the minor child.

He did not demonstrate

sympathy and understanding of the minor child.

Thordersons not

only met the requirements of the Hutchison standard but have
further established that it is in the best interests of the minor
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Duncan's brief further refers to the case of State ex
rel. H.R.V., 278 Adv. Rep. 13 (Ct. App. 11/22/95).

Duncan's brief

states that this decision is distinguishable from the case at bar.
Duncan's brief states that Jerry Duncan never lost custody of his
son nor did the appellants ever rebut the presumption and gain
custody of the child.

The Thordersons have, in fact, had custody

of the minor child by virtue of an order from the State of
Pennsylvania and an order for temporary custody from the Utah
Court. Jerry Duncan never had custody of his son. It is true that
Jerry Duncan did not lose the custody of his son to a nonparent by
court proceeding; however, there is important language in this
recent case.

This court stated the following concerning the

parental presumption articulated in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649
P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) :
The presumption normally works "in favor of a
natural parent who has the care, custody and
control of his or her child." Kishpaugh v.
Kishoauqhr 745 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1987)
(emphasis added). Indeed, all the Utah cases
previously requiring a trial court to consider
the parental
presumption
have
involved
situations where a natural parent is, for the
first time, in danger of losing legal custody
to a nonparent. See, e.g., Cooper v. DeLand.
652 P.2d 907 (Utah 1982); Hutchison v.
Hutchisonr 649 P.2d 38; Walton v. Coffman, 110
Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946).
Furthermore, sound policy dictates that the
parental presumption should not apply once the
natural parent has lost custody of his or her
child. The presumption recognizes the benefits
of having loving and able parents raise their
children despite the willingness of nonparents
who may possess superior caretaking skills.
However, the parental presumption is based on
the characteristics pertaining to a health
parent-child relationship. When custody has
8

1:: • = .i :t transferred from a i latura Ill parent to a
i in ::: i ip a i: ei it, it is because the par ent has been
shown to lack those parental characteristics
which give rise to the presumption. To allow
the parent to later rely on the presumption in
petitioning for restoration of custody would
allow the parent to rely on a nonexistent
relationship and to benefit from, a biological
designation lacking any real meaning.
Most, importantly, children have a right to be
loved, protected, and cared for, and society
has an interest in seeing that they are.
Allowing a natural parent to reassert
the
parental presumption after the parent 1 s own
conduct has destroyed that presumption would
do nothing to further the children 1 s rights or
society's goals. Neither would such a practice
serve the children's long-recognized need for
stability in relationships.
See Elmer v.
Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) . ("[T]he
emotional, intellectual, and moral development
of a child depends upon a reasonable degree of
stability in its relationships to important
people and to its environment.")
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lack,
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rather

than

a

complete

lack,

of

parental

Jdf. at 15. The Thordersons maintain that since

Jerry Duncan did not have a healthy parent-child relationship with
Clel Howard, the

easoning set forth in State ex. ~el. H.R.V. is

applicable.
Duncan's brief further makes reference to Walton v.
Coffman. 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946). The Supreme Court of Utah
in this decision recognized that the presumption is one of fact,
not one of law, and may be overcome by any competent evidence which
is sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind. Id.

at 103. Reference

is further made of the Walton decision in Kishpauah v. Kishpauah,
745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987).

In the Kishpauah case, the natural

father appealed from an order awarding custody of his natural child
to the maternal grandparents.

The natural parents were divorced

from one another and the natural mother was awarded the custody of
the minor child. She never assumed actual custody of the child and
the boy continued to reside with the maternal grandparents.

The

natural father was aware that the maternal grandparents had actual
custody and were caring for the minor child. He subsequently filed
a petition for custody.

The maternal grandparents responded by

filing a petition to obtain guardianship over the minor child. The
facts in Kishpauah are similar to the facts in the case at bar.
In Kishpauah, the trial court recognized that under
Hutchison, there is a presumption that the custody of a child
should be awarded to a natural parent.

The trial court found that

the presumption was rebutted and proceeded with the determination
10

and placement of the child for his best interests.

The Supreme

Court of Utah in Kishpauqh, stated the following:
The presumption favoring natural parents is
analogous to the presumption favoring an
existing custody arrangement. Like the natural
parent presumption, the existing placement
presumption is based on the assumption that it
will normally serve the best interests of the
child.
Id.

at 1251.

The natural father contended that the trial court

erred in evaluating his claim and that of the maternal grandparents
on an equal footing.

He maintained that there was a showing of a

strong mutual bond between himself and his son andf therefore, the
Hutchison requirements were not met. The Supreme Court pointed out
that case law was silent on whether Hutchison's three negative
findings must be made in almost mechanical fashion before a trial
court can properly conclude that the presumption in favor of the
natural parent has been overcome.

Id.

at 1252.

The Supreme Court continued to state that Hutchison
itself indicates that it does not establish a wooden formula to
which all trial court findings must conform.

The Supreme Court

held that Hutchison states that the parental presumption can be
rebutted only by evidence establishing that a particular parent at
a particular time generally lacks all three of the characteristics
that give rise to the presumption.
not an absolute lack.
is somewhat flexible.

Obviously, a "general" lack is

Thus, the standard articulate in Hutchison
Id.

at 1252.

The Supreme Court held

Hutchison requires an overall evaluation
between the parent and the child.
11

of the relationship

The very purpose of the

presumption

is in no way

advanced

by requiring

a

formulaic

statement of the trial court's conclusions regarding the three
characteristics.

Jd. at 1252.

The Supreme Court concluded that the natural parent
presumption has been rebutted when a court finds a general lack of
the three characteristics set forth in Hutchison.

It found that

the trial court did not characterize the bond as a "strong mutual"
one in Kishpaugh.

On the other hand, it found that there was a

"deep bond between" Brian (the minor child) and his grandparents.
Given the inherent imprecision of words when used and characterized
emotional

attachments

and

the

highly

fact-dependent,

interdependent, and individualized nature of these determinations,
the Supreme Court concluded that trial judge's findings, read as
a whole, satisfied the requirements of the Hutchison test.
In the case at bar, the memorandum decision of the trial
court does not make a finding of any strong mutual bond between the
minor child, Clel Howard, and the natural father, Jerry Duncan.
The trial court found that Clel's strongest bond appeared to be
with his maternal grandmother.

In fact, the trial court indicated

from the testimony of the custody evaluators that Clel had the
ability to develop a strong bond with his father; however, this
would clearly infer that there was not a strong mutual bond which
existed between the boy and his father.
The Thordersons maintain that the court erred in finding
that there was a willingness by the natural father to sacrifice
his own interest and welfare for that of the child.
12

There was no

evidence that the Thordersons were not cooperative with the natural
father in developing a father/son relationship.

The Thordersons

defer to their original brief which is on file with this court.
The trial court further erred in stating that there was
no significant evidence that the natural father lacked the sympathy
for and understanding of the minor child as characteristic of
parents generally.

The trial court erred in making its finding

that the natural father understood the problems of the minor child.
The Thordersons again defer to their original brief on file with
this court.

The natural father did not make any attempt to

understand the problems of the child nor did he have any regular
contact with the boy.

The Thordersons did not interfere with his

relationship with the minor child nor did they brainwash the child
against the natural father.
A maternal grandmother instituted a proceeding in the
district court to restrain the State Division of Family Services
from placing her grandchild out for adoption.

Wilson v. Family

Services Div., Reg. 2, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976).

The court made

a determination that the child should not be placed with the
natural parents and that the child should be placed for adoption.
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the matter of a family
relationship may be a factor which should be given due and serious
consideration. The court held that according to the laws of nature
and human experience that such immediate relatives, often referred
to as next of kin, have some legitimate concern for children of the
family and interest in their welfare. Id.
13

at 230. The court wfcnt

on to reason that in "custody matters" all things else being equal,
near relatives generally being an equal, near relatives should
generally be given preference over nonrelatives.

The maternal

grandmother in this case came forward promptly to express her love
and concern for the grandchild and offered to provide him with a
home and support.

The restraining
Id.

reinstated by the Supreme Court.

order was ordered to be
at 231. It is clear in this

case that grandparents are seriously to be considered for custody,
all things else being equal.
In summary, Clel Howard has had a long-standing close
relationship with the maternal grandparents.

This presumption

places the Thordersons on equal footing with the natural father,
Jerry Duncan.

The Thordersons seriously question the parental

presumption in favor of Jerry Duncan in that there was not a
healthy parent-child relationship existing between father and son
when Jerry Duncan sought custody of the minor child.
Duncan's

inaction

was

the

reason

for

the

absence

Jerry
of

this

relationship. This lack of relationship between father and son was
not caused by the Thordersons.

The Thordersons further maintain

that they rebutted the presumption of the natural parent under
Hutchison standard at the time of trial.

The trial record has

numerous reports and testimony from therapists and counselors that
the

stability

relationship

of
and

the
his

minor

child

residence

was

with

the

found

in

his

close

Thordersons.

The

conclusions of the experts clearly place Clel Howard with the
Thordersons.
14

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Duncan's brief cites Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). In this specific case, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for summary judgment and the district court determined
that no genuine issue of material fact existed resulting in summary
judgment.

In the case at bar, the matter did not involve a motion

for summary judgment.

The entire matter was heard at trial.

In

Watkiss & Campbell, the Supreme Court of Utah treated a motion for
reconsideration by the defense as a motion for new trial.

The

facts of that case are clearly distinguished from the case at bar.
In the case at bar, there was extensive evidence in the form of
witnesses and exhibits presented at the time of trial. The motion
of the Thordersons was, in fact, a motion for reconsideration based
upon the material facts and evidence presented at the time of
trial.
The Duncan brief further references Crookston v. Fire
Insurance Exchange. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993).

This case involved

an action against a property insurer asserting multiple claims
under contract and tort theories in connection with failure to pay
a claim.

The jury verdict awarded slightly more than $800,000.00

in compensatory damages and $4,000,000.00 in punitive damages. The
insurer appealed.
reconsideration
excessive.

The Supreme Court of Utah remanded the case for
of

whether

the

punitive

damages

award

was

The Supreme Court ruled that a new trial to allow the
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jury to reconsider its award after receiving new instructions under
the holding of the Supreme Court on a prior appeal was not
necessary. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from
the case at bar.
a new trial.

In the Crookston case, the insurer was seeking

The Thordersons were not seeking a new trial by

filing a motion for reconsideration.

There was no signed order or

judgment entered at the time of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration.

The trial court brought counsel into chambers

after the trial and prior to the issuance of the memorandum
decision and stated that there would be a hearing at the end of a
120 day period after the minor child had been placed with the
natural

father

to determine whether

the child had made the

adjustment from the Thordersons to Jerry Duncan. This decision of
the trial court did not appear in the memorandum decision.

In

addition, the Thordersons filed a supplemental brief after the date
of trial and prior to the issuance of the memorandum decision
referring the court to Tuckey v. Tuckev, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982)
and Kishpauah v. Kishpauahf 745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987) . These cases
clearly interpreted the Hutchison standard and addressed the equal
footing of the maternal grandparents in that the presumption in
favor of an existing custody arrangement should be carefully
considered against the presumption in favor of a natural parent.
Duncan's brief states that with the passing of almost a
full month before the minute entry is difficult to say that Judge
Rokich did not consider the motion of the appellants. There is no
evidence to support this statement. The motion for reconsideration
16

was clearly relevant to the issues at bar in the denial of such
motion by the trial court was error.
CONCLUSION
The close relationship of Clel Howard with the maternal
grandparents was of long standing.

There was a very healthy

relationship between the maternal grandparents and the minor child.
This presumption clearly placed the Thordersons on at least an
equal

footing

with

the

natural

father,

Jerry

Duncan.

The

Thordersons further maintain that there was not a healthy parentchild relationship between Jerry Duncan and Clel Howard and, as a
result, the parental presumption would not even apply.
court

clearly

presumption

erred

did not

in

failing

apply

to

find

that

the

The trial
parental

or, in the alternative, that the

Thordersons were on equal footing with the natural father.

As a

result, the best interests of the minor child was at issue before
the trial court. Overwhelming evidence from both lay witnesses and
experts, clearly indicate that the child should remain with the
maternal grandparents and that there would be substantial injury
by transfer of the child to the natural father.

In addition,

Thordersons claim that they clearly met the three requirements of
the Hutchison standard at the time of trial anyway.
The trial judge met with counsel in chambers after trial
and before the memorandum decision and made certain findings.
These findings were not reflected in the memorandum decision.

In

addition, the supplemental brief of the Thordersons was presented
to the court prior to the entry of a signed order and judgment.
17

Thordersons maintain that the trial court should have granted the
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and erred in the denial of this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/"Yia^

/p/~ day of

1996.
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ADDENDUM

Third Judicial District

DEC 0 G m
SAL I LAKfc l U U f r f Y
By—

—
Deputy Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JEROME K. DUNCAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
: CASE NO. 910905919
:

EILEEN M. HOWARD, et al.,
Defendants•

:
:

This case was tried on September 28f 29, 30, 1994. Plaintiff
was represented by Dean B. Ellis.

Defendants Sandra and Larry

Thorderson were represented by John Spencer Snow. Defendant Eileen
Howard was represented by Leslie Slaugh.

The Court heard oral

testimony, admitted documentary evidence and reviewed in detail the
custody evaluations submitted by the respective parties. The Court
took the matter under advisement.

FACTS
The child, Clel Howard, who is the subject matter of these
proceedings is the natural child of Jerome Duncan and Eileen
Howard.

Clel was born out of wedlock on October 12, 1988.

Plaintiff learned of Clel's birth three months after Clel's
birth and commenced paying $150 per month for Clel's support.
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Plaintiff paid support for about four and one-half years and
established a regular routine of weekly visits with Clel.
In 1991, plaintiff filed a paternity action and established
that he was the natural father of Clel. Upon the establishment of
paternity, visitation with Clel was resumed until April 7, 1992
when defendant Howard

allowed Clel to live with his natural

grandmother in Pennsylvania.
A series of hearings were held in the Utah court and in the
Pennsylvania court regarding visitation and custody of Clel during
the pendency of this action.

Defendants Thorderson were granted

custodial rights to Clel with the final resolution of custody and
visitation issues.
Defendant Howard left Clel when he was nine months old with
his maternal grandmother.
interest in Clel.

Defendant Howard did not exhibit an

Defendant did not develop parental skills or

develop a bond with Clel. Defendant's lifestyle did not create an
environment where Clel could be nurtured, loved, shown affection or
attention that would allow him to have the normal mother/son
relationship.
Defendant left the responsibility of raising Clel to her
mother, who with her husband assumed the role of parents for Clel.
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Plaintiff, Duncan, is now in his third marriage and exhibited
a lack of stability in his early adulthood.
adult children by a prior marriage.

Plaintiff had two

Plaintiff has not maintained

a relationship with these children.
Plaintiff

is presently married

to Diane Duncan who was

previously married and had three children by her first marriage.
She is employed at Stauffers in Utah County.
Plaintiff is a college graduate and is also employed at
Stauffers.

Plaintiff and his present wife have adequate living

quarters and income to provide for Clel.
The defendants Thorderson have had custody of Clel since April
of 1992 and have assumed the role of parenting Clel.

Mrs.

Thorderson was previously married and had four children by her
first marriage. This is Mr. Thorderson's first marriage. He is 52
years old and Mrs. Thorderson is 41 years old.
stable

marriage,

and

more

than

adequate

Defendants have a
living

facilities.

Defendants Thorderson provide a stable environment for Clel.
As a result of the instability

in Clel's life, he has

developed emotional problems which will require continued therapy
in order for him to adjust to the custodial and visitation orders
entered by the Court.
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ARGUMENT
In custody disputes between a parent and a non-parent, the
Utah State Supreme Court has ruled that there is a presumption in
favor of custody being awarded to the parent which can only be
rebutted by showing that:

(1) no strong mutual bond exists; (2)

the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or
her own interests and welfare for the child's interest and welfare;
and (3) the parent lacks a sympathy for and understanding of the
child that is characteristic of parents generally.

Hutchinson v.

Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982).
Clel's

strongest

bond

appears

to

be

with

his

maternal

grandmother which is understandable, because he was placed with her
shortly after birth.

However, his bonding to plaintiff has been

hampered because plaintiff has not had the opportunity to develop
the bonding relationship with the child.

The review of the file

and the transcript of those proceeu- gs evidences the resistance
plaintiff has met in establishing a close relationship with Clel.
The testimony of the custody evaluators in this case led the Court
to believe that with continued therapy sessions, Clel can develop
a strong bond with his father.
Clel has suffered a great deal of trauma in his life because
of his mother abandoning him at three months of age, and not being
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allowed to establish a normal relationship with his father.

As a

result of the trauma in his life, Clel suffers from emotional
problems which are presently being treated and must be treated for
an extensive period of time.
Plaintiff understands that Clel must continue in a therapy
program in order for Clel to overcome the fears and anxieties he
has developed as a result of the custodial issue.

Plaintiff and

defendants have expressed a willingness to continue to work with
therapists to resolve Clel's emotional problems.
Plaintiff has demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his own
interest and welfare for the child's. It is evident that plaintiff
cared about Clel and is willing to sacrifice his own interests for
the child's, however, the defendants were not cooperative and did
not further a father/son relationship between Clel and plaintiff.
There was no significant evidence that plaintiff lacked the
sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic
of

parents

generally.

The

Court

believes

that

plaintiff

understands the problems that have been created by Clel being born
out of wedlock, the abandonment of Clel by his mother, and the lack
of regular visitation by him with Clel.
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Plaintiff's extended family testified about the importance of
family and are desirous of making Clel an integral part of the
extended family.
The Court has considered Clel's feelings in this case and
understands the apprehension he may have in establishing a new
home, a new environment and the sense of security he may have with
the defendants Thordersons.

However, the Court is convinced that

with the cooperation of all of the parties and the continued
therapy sessions for Clel, that Clel can make the adjustment to new
surroundings satisfactorily.
Clel

would

probably

prefer

to

remain

with

defendants

Thorderson, because they have been the primary caretakers for most
of his life.

However, defendants Thordersons created much of the

problem in Clel accepting his father because of their resistance to
allowing plaintiff to become the father he desired to be. The fact
that he had to file a lawsuit is indicative of the defendant's
resistance to allow plaintiff to be a father.
There is no evidence that plaintiff is now engaged in immoral
activity.

The Court believes that the plaintiff has matured from

the time he met defendant Howard and is a much more stable person
than he was in 1988.
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Granted, plaintiff does not enjoy the same economic status of
the Thordersons, but he has the financial means by which to
adequately provide for Clel's needs.
In this case plaintiff

and defendants

are of the same

religious faith and are active members, assuring Clel of compatible
religious training with plaintiff and defendants.

CONCLUSION
The

Court

awards

custody

to plaintiff,

subject

to the

following conditions.
1.

Clel shall remain with the Thordersons until the end of

the present school year. Ten days after the school year ends, Clel
shall be delivered to plaintiff at Salt Lake City at plaintiff's
expense.
2.

Clel shall remain in the therapy program that he is

presently enrolled, and the therapist shall prepare Clel for the
transition of custody to his father.

Plaintiff and defendants

Thorderson shall bear the costs equally.
3.

Plaintiff's therapist and Thorderson's therapist shall

communicate and establish a treatment program and a visiting
schedule for defendant Howard and defendants Thorderson to visit
with Clel which shall be submitted to the Court for approval by the
end of the school year.
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Plaintiff and defendant shall name their therapists

within 30 days from the date of entry of this Judgment*
Each party shall bear their own fees and costs.
Plaintiff's
Conclusions

of

counsel
law,

and

shall

prepare

a Judgment

Findings

&

Fact

and

in accordance with this

Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

of

day of December, 1994.

JOHN A. ROK^Cli
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this /^
December, 1994:

Maddi-Jane Sobel
Dean B. Ellis
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3600 S. Market Street
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Leslie Slaugh
Attorney for Defendant
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